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So far as t,ne nistory of philosophy and ths philosophical discussion of
t,he past half cent.pry have tafcen any not.e of fcjhs school of thought founded
fry J.A. Fries, it, has been much rather t.o use it as a fcind of' foil in order
t,o bring out t,he merits of the contrasted transcendental school than t.o
assign, t.o it independent value; and it is a reasonable claim that, has been i
made in recent years by the new Artesian school t.nat, its so-called., "psycho¬
logical, "memod should be impartially examined and judged on. ii,s intrinsic
merits.It. is the object of this Thesis to enquire into the importance of
t.he philosophical method wnion was so elaborately expounded b.y Aries and to
consider »nether the very considerable revival of interest in nis thought,
ana writings possessed any real significance.
•Ja «-Ob F'r led rich Aries was born in tp.3 year 1773 at Barby on t.ne Slba,-£a
nis father being a clergyman cf t.he community of fcjhe Brethren.He- studied
first at Leipzig ana t.hen at Jena at; fc.h© very period when Aichte,Schelling
and Hegel were ail. connected with the latter university.In 1300 he acquired
the right to lecture at Jena and in 1303 oe- published a polemical treatise
against Reinhoid,Aicnt.e and Scheliing,in which he opposed their method of
developing Kant,, and the critical philosophy.In t.he years succeeding t.his his
chief w or Its were written: "itfissen, Olaube ■ and Ahndang"in 1305, "Rene. Srit.ilt
der yernunft" in - the most, complete statement of his system - in 1307.
In 1305 he was called to a cnair of philosophy at Heidelberg and in 1313
was transferred to Jena in the same capacity. His int.erest in the' movements
of patriotic thought, and feeling that were st.irring 3'ermany at t.hat time
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leek him to direct his energies also towards public life and several of t.ne
pamphlets which he t..nen wrote are still read.An injudicious step which he
took, in 1817 in political affairs led to legal proceedings being taken
against hi as and ultimately t.o his deposition from nis chair. Later (in' 1324)
he was appointed to a professorship of Mathematics and Physios,but from
t,his time on nis activity and t.ne extent; of' his influence became less/Books
which ne issued after t.nis time such as S.The handbook of Psychical Anthrop¬
ology", "Handbook of Philosophy of Religion and of' Aesthetic",are maia/ly
restatements^ enlarging particular points, of' the system contained in t,he
earlier worms.Besides t.nese ne wrote a- "History of Philosophy"anc^evsral
less important, worms. He died on August; 10th.1343.
His opinions did not impress tjasmselves on large numbers of his contem¬
poraries nor did ...ney nave, any prominent effect on t;ne thought and writing
of t.ne subsequent generations.Yet it would not ds t.rue- t.o say that t.hsy
nave been without their influence.Round Fries thsre did rally a school of
like-minded men,who issued a series of philosophical writings under the
title of "Proceedings of t.he Friesian School",and from several of the phil¬
osophical chairs in Jermany these men continued to teach tae Friesian sys¬
tem of philosophy .Such men were E.F.Apelt and J. Schmid, professors in. Jena
and in. Heidelberg,books by both of whom, incorporating essentially Friesian
thought.,have- been reissued within recent years.Apelt's "Metaphysic"i.3 a
reasoned statement, of the .Friesian doctrine for the use of students;and
Sonmid's "Lectures on Pniiosophy"is an admirable discussion of t.he- meaning
ana value or the st.udy of philosophy,written t.o serve as an introduction to
philosophy from the Friesian standpoint.Beneke,Ourgen Pona Meyer and Trap-
^flgiosaor
otjtier
-engieeser are three- writers or some importance who were m practicalA
agreement wit,h Fries's met,hod;ana witain t.he last generation Fries has had
at least a negative value as a typical representative of" a positipn which
philosophers of the transcendental school nave felt, themselves called upon
to oppose. Windelbarid,e.g.,directed nis criticism against Fries in his artIp
art-iole' on "Critical or fenetic Method" in nis "Praludien'Vand a number of
nis pupils nave followed out the same subject from a similar standpoint.. It
is only witnin very recent years that a real revival of Friesianism has
t.asen place and Fries's own side of t,he question nas again had justice done
to it.Headed by Leonard Nelson -a lecturer in Gr'ottiagen - a regular Fries-
ran school was again organised and several volumes of "Proceedings"were
again issued.Although the number of" it,s members had not become large, it. wasj,
in t.he years immediately preceding the war,full of confidence in the cause
which it represented and contained several names of influence and distinct¬
ion. And outside of t.ne school it,self the appearance of such a worm as
filsenhans' "Kant and Fries"gave evidence of the wider stimulus to philosoph¬
ical t.nougnt in dermany that had begun to flow from Fries.
In addition tp this more purely philosophical st.ream of influence,
•8
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there has come from Fries a not inconsiderable influence on theology apd on
the philosophy of religion. PeWet.t.e, who, t Qg^rhw1 with 8o ill s i'srmac he r, m&
be called one of the fathers of modern t.neoiogy, confessedly derived nis
philosophical basis from Fries? and there were others such as fholuci who
found t.heir inspiration at t.ne same source. It. is true that except, indirect¬
ly t,hr:ough the influence of f.aese men, Frissiaaism does not seem to have
played any conspicuous part in the theological life of the past half cent¬
ury,, out., in this direction also it would seem to nave, come' to new life in
ope last few years.Professor Rudolph. Otto of Oottingeri+orie of" the- ablest,
of tae younger t,Ideological thinners in 3-ermany-nas issued a boos on the "
"Kant-Friesian Philosophy of Religion" expressly as an introduction bp bps
stpdy of systematic theology.In it. he nas declared himself a convert. t,o ipe
system of Fries and, although he was until a few years ago a devoted stud¬
ent. and disciple of Schleiermacher,he nas renounced that allegiance and has
Declared his opinion that. Fries deserves a higher place than Schleiermacher.
was „
in the history of thought, upon religion.In this view he followed notably
by Professor jjousset but, also by a considerable number of men in the rant
ana file of the< theologians of Jermany.
Thus tne question of Friesianism,whatever be tne future before it,is
a living question today and calls for consideration.The system is many-
sided and is developed to a commendable spate of completeness,but., it is
not; necessary in order to form a judgment upon it, t.o follow it, into all
its details,ar to examine very closely tne peculiar terms which it, uses.It
will be sufficient if we confine our attention to three main points,which
are the distinguishing features of the system and t.ns particulars in which
Fries depaft,s from nis c-iose general adherence t.o Kant. These three1 poitit.s
will form ijne t.nree divisions of this Thesis - (l)Friesrs Method, (-2)His
doctrine of ope Ideas of Pure Reason,(3)His doctrine of Premonition or
Intuition of the Infinite.
1. Fries' s Met.hod.
It. is round his method that t.hs ehief interest; in Fries has gathered
ana it. was here that he himself claimed t.o have made an important advance
oil Kant. He disbelieved entirely in t.hei value: of t,he new Idealism of Fichte
and Soheiling wnicn he held to he. only a new Kind of Dogmatism, attempting
to deduce, from an abstract and empty principle - the bare '!Ego" - the con¬
crete whole of reality.Along that line it seemed t.o him impossible for phii
osophy to advance except into a mass where each man could obscure from him-
self the light of reality by throwing round him a naze of ideas of his own
construction.From mare &,nought, can come only analytic judgments;and Fries
maintained accordingly that these Absolute Idealists had really deserted
the- basis of trie Crit.icial Philosophy and gone off in a direction diametric¬
ally opposed t.o Kant's.To seek to construct tjtie- system of reality out of
merely abstract principles was t.o fail back int.o essentially tjhe same error
as Kant; had condemned in Leibniz and Woif.lt; is in t;his opposition to the
Idealists that the followers of Fries,past, and present,find reason for the
insignificant; part which the Friesian development of Kant has played in t.ne
nistpry of the past; cent,ury.The- bolder and more romantic and larger lines
of the great. Idealist systems have captivated |nd held captive- the imagin¬
ation of several generations and tnus nave thrown int.o the shade the less
ambitious.programme of t,he Friesian school.Nevertheless Fries always cher¬
ished tne expectation that in spite of the neglect which he experienced
tne time would come when the Hegelian infatuation would pass away and the
value of the true critical school would be recognised, f01" aaQy y®ars there
was no ground for imagining that his faith might he justified.Hsgelianism
and its developments continued to predominate and if not directly, then, w&eti
indirectly,tp have an all-pervasive influence.This influence has,however,
of iatp years somewhat decayed,and the' followers of Pries tpink bpab; tns
times are again ready tp receive their gospel.Alt,.hough Hegel has contribut¬
ed much to philosophical development; and enriched largely hps sb.ore of pon-
semotive ideas, the tendency seems of iatp t,o nave away from Hegel back, t.o
Kant,as though Hegel had been leading up a blind alley.Kant is the common
starting point,, of tpe Friesian and Hegelian schools and naturally a falling
away in tne authority of Hegeiianism gives an impulse towards an examinat¬
ion of Friasianism. If the one line of deveippment has failed may not t.fte
otper succeed?It is at, least wortp considering whether tne Priesiaa metpod
of interpreting and developing Kant does not give more nope of permanent
success than has been found to lie in tjhe other.
In tpe Friesian system tpe question of philosophical method is central.
It,- is recognised to be a. first, necessity of philosophical thought; that it
should fix upon a valid met.hod of procedure.Nelson and otper modern Fries-
ians contend,entirely in the spirit of their master,that philosophy never
can reach any adequate results,until,like tne sciences,it nas secured a
more or less universal method,which later tpought may modify and develops
but, which will nave a secure basis that will be common to all time.The
differences ret,ween philosophers have been largely due, bpe.y maintain,to
the fact tpat no sucn common method has been followed;each philosopher: has
simply constructed nis own system out of nis own ideas, arbitrarily ascrib¬
ing reality to tne creature of his own brain.The Frisians hold with Kant
that before any such creations can have value^ tne capacity and nature of
tne Reason must be subjected to examination and its limits and possibilit¬
ies recognised and fixed.
It is from Kant that Pries sets out here as throughout the system.Yet,
though in agreement with the general conclusions of the critical method,he
differs very considerably and snows considerable independence in restating
*>ttetne metnoa itself in order to reach,as he believes he does,a truer and
more adequate result with regard t.o tae natur.e of the reality witn which we
come into contact.He criticises Kant for not having properly understood the
relations of the different activities of Reason to one another and finds in
this defect the source of many of what seem to aim Kant's faults.Especially
does t.nis affect such questions as those of the existence of the t.ning-ia-
itself,of the limitation of knowledge to knowledge of" the understanding and
■V.u,he adoption of sensuous experience as the ultimate criterion of reality.
Pries differs from Kant, on each of these questions;he extends the reach of
knowledge,developing the thing-in-itself beyond Kant's conception of it,anc
he denies to sensuous experience any exclusively normative authority.All
tnis ne does on the basis that the true method to follow is that of self-
examination^ which is to be carried out so taorougnly as to be able to react
eventually a complete theory of Reason in amion every part will nave its
place and the powers of the whole will likewise be determined.Kant's fault,
ne maintains,was that although ae set out witn tnis object in view, ne did
not carry tne examination far enough but abandoned it for a less general
principle.
In a sense therefore the method of Pries is avowedly psychological
and it, is not surprising that tne charge of seeking to establish a priori
principles on empirical grounds nas been brought,'against him.Of the poss-
3,
ibie interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pare Reason,the almost universal
opinion has agreed that tne psychological is the most superficial and the
least true. It has been generally maintained that to c-onfuse Kant's transcei
dent,al met,nod wit;h psychology is to deprive the Critical Philosophy of its
value.It is not only the actual but the necessary principle of knowledge
wnich it seeks to reveal and establish and a mere examination of the facts
such as psychology undertakes cannot do more than reveal the results and
metnods of historical development.Psychology is an empirical science and
to base our ultimate principles merely on it would be to assign to inem no
rational necessity.
But, the charge on this ground fails in reference to the Priesian
method for the simple reason that Pries himself recognised the necessity
of avoiding tne charge and deliberately sought to do so.H9 was under no
delusion as to tne nature of his method.He was aware that from psychology
as a tneory of the development of consciousness rational principles cannot
be deduced and he did not attempt,therefore,to substitute a merely psych¬
ological enquiry for a true deduction.He explicitly stated, that his method
had nothing to do with the history of Reason."The necessary truths etc.are
grounded m our reason quite independently of the sensuous stimulations
and developments and are brought to our knowledge by consciousnesss in gen¬
eral, not as something now for t,he first time coming into our possession but
simply as our original property".This point is emphasised by him again and
again and it- was exactly in order to avoid misunderstanding that ae adoptee
the name "Anthropology"to describe his method rather than the name "Psychol
ogy" whicn. ne recognised to be the property oti the one hand of the so—calle
9.
rational psychology and on. tns other of t.he purely empirical psychology, will
neither of which did he wish to have much in common.Fries cannot he dismiss-
ed in a sentence simply as one of the- misinterpreters of the critical
method.Sucn a judgment can he based on nothing else than ignorance of the~ _
\
explanations which ne himself gives. For, fries:.himself his method was con¬
fessedly psychological hut only in the sense that it involved as one fund¬
amental part of it an examination of knowledge from the inside.
Ana from tnis point of view it is true to say that every theory of know¬
ledge must he psychological.L.Nelson putjs this in other words when ne para¬
doxically maintains tnat "Spistemology" is impossible,that any attempted-
tneory of knowledge must inevitably include a circular argument.He argues
rigntiy tnat it. is of no use setting out to prove the validity of knowledge
or to base its validity on something other than itself since we are always
at tne end left with the necessity of assuming that the last act of know¬
ledge is a valid one. Whatever method is attempted, whether that, of seeking
to find an intellectual proof of ultimate principles or that of reducing
the necessity of knowledge to an ethical necessity,the attempt 9ither ends
in an infinite regress or rests on a circular argument, fiivery man,be he
sceptic or not,is bound to,and actually does,assume even in his doubting
that what he says is nob. merely a phantom of his own brain but something
which is true independently of his private judgment and which properly is
to be believed by every rational being.That is to sa.y^ it is assumed that
ultimately it is of the- nature of thought h.o reach reality. Apart from this
assumption tnere would be no possibility of having any knowledge at all or
at least the distinction between knowledge and imagination would cease to
exist.The activity of knowing is an ultimate one behind which it is imposs-
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ibie to get to examine it. We can examine knowledge only Dy means of snow-
ledge itself and, however often we may repeat ttie analysis of tiae process^
tne trustworthiness of the faculty remains always an assumption.That what
we know is true, is simply a fact without which ail tninking would be an
impossibility.
Therefore Pries is right in insisting tnat tne true ideal of the
critical method is an immanent Critique of Reason and that an independent
criticism of the validity of the whole knowing faculty is not possible.A
tneory of knowledge can be nothing more than an examination of the diffsrenl
factors involved in it and the consideration of the claims of each to the
authority wnich belongs to the whole.This is the true method and it is this
which Pries attempt.ee/to follow and to which he applied the name "Antnropo-
i e a
logy".Re sought not to justify the various principles of thought by basing
their authority on anything outside of themselves,but simply to find for
eacn its place in the whole of Reason in order that the part might share
in the validity of the whole.It is true that Pries was not so deeply im¬
pressed with the great philosophic demand for unity as his contemporaries
of tne Idealist school but. it is nevertheless equally true tnat the idea of
system lies at the very centre of ail nis thought.The mere psychological
fact of the existence of any particular principle or idea in the mind was
not to be in any sense evidence of its validity.The discovery of the fact
was only a means to an end ana tnat end was a complete system of the activ¬
ities and faculties of Reason,each placed in its relation to the whole.It
was not a genetic or historical account of tne mental processes that he had
in. view but a theory of the essential nature of the Reason that is at work
in every man of every age at every stage of development.
11.
To obtain that theory Pries found it necessary to discuss much that
m
would toaay be classed along with empirical psychology and into that we
need not follow nim.His treatment of the truths of Pure Season is fortun¬
ately not fundamentally involved in any particular psychological difficult.,y.
Although it includes some purely empirical discussion,this does not vitiate
Ins method.The empirical enquiry is only the first stage and does not pro¬
fess to be t.ne whole. It is simply a preliminary examination of the constit¬
uent factors actually employed in Knowledge,undertaken with tne intention
of distinguishing those which are based on mere experience and derived, from
empirical sources from those which cannot be so derived.The latter as well
as the former are actually to be found in our Knowledge sines they form tne
necessary basis of it all,and careful analysis will be able to distinguish
tne one class from the otner and thus present the philosopher with the
facts which ne nas to seel to co-ordinate and explain.
In ApeIt and Schrnid this question of fact practically becomes the
wnole question and obscures the other aspect almost altogether.The import¬
ance of a theory of Reason in order to justify and establish the facts is
not so cent.ral in them as in Pries. Having found by analysis that we are in
possession of certain principles which do not have their origin in the
senses,they are content to conclude that these principles must be rational
necessities without seeling for any fur;,,her justification of them.Pries,on
the other hand,refuses to. proceed so easily to this conclusion.The factual
enquiry is made.by aim asiby the others,but wnen he has carried it through
he nas not, finished.It is. but, a preliminary part of nis soneme.Whether
ijhese non-sensuous principles revealed to be in oirr possession admit of
proof ana in what sense, is a question* t.hao; is not prejudged by aim. He
12.
leaves t.he way quite open for the consideration, of' t.aat point; at; a later
st.age.lt; is only as a first, step In his procedure that, he bases up the
question of fact and deveiopes the method appropriate bo its solution.
The actual existence of necessary and ultimate principles in exper¬
ience is revealed for' Pries, just as it; was for £ant,In t.he existence of
synthetic judgments a priori - i.s.judgments claiming universal validity
which yet. do not merely analyse a concept already Known and justified.
Without, such judgments experience would fall to pieces.Tne whole fabric
of it, is built upon them and^ since this is so,we have only t,o examine that
fabric carefully ;.,o find out its basis.That is to say,that b.here are ne¬
cessary principles involved in experience is an evident fact;what these
principles are may be found by abstracting from all that is empirical in a
judgment so t,hat tne purely rational element may stand revealed.The' ultim¬
ate principles wiii be seen when all tnat is merely derivative das been
stripped off.The method,therefore,which the phiiospphic enquirer has to
follow is in the first instance that of analysis.He must study and distin¬
guish the different factors whic-h enter into tne formation of judgments; he
must recede from one principle^ to another until at last he reaches one
which admits of no further division.When ne has reached that,he will have
attained to an ultimate principle of Reason; and by carrying out a complet.e
analysis of ail forms of thought,he can obtain a complete statement of ail
b,nese ultimate principles.
The actual metnod of analysis which is followed is,however,somewhat
disappointing after such promises.For the Friesians the analysis of exper¬
ience resolves itself into an analysis of the forms of judgment.Th9y follow
here aimos,; exactly the line followed by Kant in the Transcendental Logic.
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With the judgment., as their clue they reac-h the same table of categories as
Kant reached and state them in the same way,and yet they neglect almost
entirely the much more valuable part of Kant's enquiry which is given in
the Transcendental Deduction.T'hey do this deliberately bat because of a
misunderstanding of the significance of Kant's argument.In the following
discussion it will become evident that the Transcendental Deduction is not
in opposition to,but, essentially complementary to,the Friesian Analysis.
Indeed it is only a more adequate way of carrying out t.he same object.
Meanwhile let us follow the frriesian argument.Clearly, so far the
wnole result is at the most merely an answer to the quaestio facti.Assuming
that such an analysis can be effectively carried out,we can secure by it
only a statement of what principles actually are involved in particular
aspects of Knowledge as we have it.The^ quaetio juris,the question as to
what, validity belongs to them eit.her absolutely or relatively,has not, been
tou&ned.Put Fries is under no delusion on this point. Be recognises that t.he
quaetio juris is a further one and setting himself to answer it he finds
an answer along at least iwo separate lines.Tne first answer is based on
nis theory of "Immediate Knowledge of Reason",which Nelson has enthusiastic-
t ally declared to be the greatest philosophical discovery since Kant.Accord¬
ing to it, Fries finds the authority of the categories not merely incapable
of proof but not demanding it.Ultimate principles,he maintains,cannot be
proved.Proof means simply that we refer one judgment to some judgment whos<
A
authority has a higher degree of validity than itself,but ultimately we are
bound to arrive at a principle for whose.validity we can find no higher
guarantee.Similarly "demonstration"iS inapplicable to philosophical prin¬
ciples since they cannot be represented in perceptible form.If there is
w.
sacn a tiling,therefore, as giving a reason for tns validity of metaphysical
principles it. mast, be of a totally different Kind from either proof or
demonstration.Hence the distinct.ion fldaiite is drawn between the"groand"and
the'tjustification".To give the former for a metaphysical principle is im¬
possible. It can apply only to truths of a secondary nature.Put the latter
is as necessary for metaphysical pis for all Knowledge, and it is to be
found in t.nis case not in any other truth but in tne truth itself as it, is
Known.In being Known,it is Known by a Kind of immediate insight to be cer¬
tain and universal.Phis clearly Implies the existence of some other source
of Knowledge than tne faculties of perception and reflection,from neither
of which can we derive ultimate principles.Sensation gives us new truths
but it never gives us anything more than particulars;as Hume proved,it can
never rise to tne universal or the necessary.Similarly,from reflection no
universal truth can come for it merely repeats amd"heshapes the facts that
have been obtained through the senses.Hence we are bound to assume the
existence of another faculty whereby these universal truths can maie their
entry into consciousness.This faculty Pries does not seek to define further
but names simply the Immediate Knowledge of Reason.Its only definition is
i'T
from tne result it achieves..It is not "intellectual perception" which by
the very act of thinking reaches new truths but it is a Kind of insight
which recognises even unconsciously the unconditional validity of these
fundamental principles of aii thought;.Its existence is a kind of hypothesis
assumed because of the necessity of accounting for the presence of these
particular conceptions in the whole of our experience.We can nevsr in the
nature of things examine the faculty itself in operation but although our
Knowledge of it is thus only mediately reached,it itself is as immediate
and as original an element of oar rational nature as is the perception of
the senses.It is the nature of phiiosopnical truths to be hidden away be-
naattj^ne more superficial par..,s of our experience so that most men are ig¬
norant that they possess tnem.Nevertheless although tnus obscured tney are
present in every rational judgment and may be brought to light in every man
by the process of self-examination.Although reflection is not an organ by
which new truths are introduced,it is an organ by which we can become con¬
scious of truths of whose existence in the mind we were formerly ignorant.
Thus every man possesses this Immediate Knowledge of Reason but. not every
man is conscious of his possessionsince not everyone is sufficiently able
or sufficiently well disciplined to be capable of reflecting upon himself
with sufficient concentration to male a successful analysis of his own
knowledge.The fact that most men 3,re ignorant of the existence of this
faculty is no real argument, against its existence,since all actually live 4*
t
by tne unowiedge which it alone is capable of bringing to them.
Although Nelson nas called the discovery of this faculty the most
important philosophical discovery since Kant, it; is difficult 1,0 admit that
it has any value for a theory of lnowiedge.lt stands alongside the immedr
iate knowledge of perception and is assigned a measure of validity of the
same degree of certainty as that.Here,clearly,the psychological bias has
caused a real misinterpretation of the metaphysician's task.The immediate
knowledge of perception is a psychological fact and in practical life
immediate perception and truth are identified,but this identification is
logically not more t.nan an assumption wnicn itself requires to be justified
Similarly,even granting that such a faculty as the Immediate Knowledge of
16.
Reason existed,tne immediate insight which it is supposed to have into the
ultimate
validity of tne principles which it reaches would be nothing more than
another psychological fact.In order i,o show tnat these principles spring
from Pure Reason - which is doubtless the object of this part of {Trias's
theory-something quite different from such a nyjjothssis is required.Quest¬
ions of t,he origin of principles have nothing to do with questions.of val¬
idity.
The answer to this would doubtless be that while that is true in
every other case it is not applicable to the case in question since here
tne psychological fact is of such a nature that it is its own justification.
That is to say that in tae knowledge of these principles their validity is
already implied.That,however,will only drive us back to the recognition of
the essentially circular nature of this argument,since at once the question
arises as to how these particular principles are to be distinguished from
* fke'j
others.They are distinguished ultimately only by the fact that _a.ro purely
rational.lt is only for this reason that tjhey are assumed to be the objects
of tne Immediate Knowledge of Pure Reason.And yet it is this very fact that
their origin in that faculty seems to be assumed to establish..That is to
say,we find certain principles which appear to transcend every empirical
source of knowledge; on the assumption that they actually are nob empirical
but, purely rational we postulate?a source for t.nese very principles in
this Immediate Knowledge of Pure Reason ; and then it is -is. argued tnat
this postulated faculty can be used to establish tne validity of the prin¬
ciples wnose validity is tne presupposition of its own existence.Clearly
tne question as to the validity of the principles must be settled first and
independently,before any such faculty can even be established as a fact,and
17.
tnen it. would ranx only as one hypothesis among others constructed to snow
tne origin and growth of such conceptions in the mind.
Although this ".Begr unhung" of the categories fails,the- Friesian system
fort.unately does not fall with it.There is a second method by which Fries
attempts to establish the validity of tne categories.lt is recognised that
some Deduction of the principles is necessary and this occupies a more
central position in the system than the Immediate Knowledge which we have
been discussing.lt is through the Deduction fcjhat the quaestio juris is to
be finally answered,but it is important to distinguish tne Friesian Deduct¬
ion from the Transcendental Deduction of Kant.The objects of both are the
same - to just.ify the a priori validity of the categories - but the methods
are different in principle.Fries directly criticises and rejects the method
which Kant deliberately follows.To base tne authority of the categories on
t.he part t.ney play in experience is,according to Fries,a circular argument,-
since experience is simply what we make it ourselves and an analysis of it
can give us no more than a statement of what we have already assumed.Indeed,
he maintains,toe socalled Transcendental Method is not different from the
Psychological method.From the analysis of experience we find out what are
the presuppositions of t.ne actual experience which we- have^but as to the
necessity of any one of t.hese or of the whole of them we have proved noth¬
ing. Experience is not an independent criterion of validity but only anot.-her
way of stating tne factual existence of the categories.To prove that our
experience without the categories would be impossible is merely a method
of emphasising and confirming the conclusions of our original analysis and
further evidence that these principles do lie below all our thought.
'To.-fi.frpw tftoi-r-neooaoary valia-ity Frias>aar>ry;jJ1^-n4»
13.
To snow tneir nsosssay validity Pries,carrying nis psychological
A
tendencies one step furt,tier, adopts another method of Deduction and aims at
snowing that from the nature of Reason ail tnese principles must necessar-,
ily follow.The fundamental principle-here is that of tne unity of Reason.
Unity Pries maintains to he the ultimate characteristic of everything t.hat
is rat.ional.lt is involved in the very conception of truth,and is evident
in every relation established by mathematical or physical law.All knowledge
is tne attainment of unities between diverse things and t.fte complete snow-
ledge will re the Knowledge that is perfectly unified.To this sphere Pries
transfers the two phrases "Transcendental Apperception" and "Formal Apper¬
ception", malting a distinction between t.hem.T'he former is the complete unity
of the content of eiJ possible Knowledge : the latt.er is the unity of all
the forms of Pure Reason.It. i« argued that uniijy in the content implies
unity in the forms."The Transcendental Apperception is itself possible only
through sucn a general and original Pormal Apperception which is the source
oi^.11 unity in our Reason".If we show,then,how this original unity must
worm itiSeif out in the forms of the categories we snail have given the suf¬
ficient justification of the rationality of these forms.And this is what
Pries endeavours t.o do in the Deduction.He attempts to show that cause and
effect and tne other categories are all indispensable as forms of the
necessary unity of phenomena,that in order to unite all the manifold of
perception into a .unity these are the forms which Reason must use.
This parr.; of pries's scheme does not seem to have received much
consideration from Apelt wno omits it altogether from his restatement of
tne Priesiaa philosophy.Nevertheless ais most reoea'u followers such as
Nelson insist on tne importance of this as the true safeguard against a
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merelyMpsyohological,,Metapi3ysic.Jlut it is notable that important as this is
said to bs little consideration is given to it.This cannot bs because
Fries's own account is adequate for it is neither clear nor convincing.
Rataer is the reason to bs found in the inherent impossibility of what it 4j
is proposed to attempt.lt is possible to show that certain principles,once
we have found them,are rational,i.e.that they help to unify and systematise
o-^wra^fe. dUre LC 'OVX
but it is not. possible to proceed in the jiff oroat war/ and show what from
the nature of Reason just such principles must proceed.Reason cannot bs
known in the abs ract since it can be known only through the mediation of
its own activity.It is only as it actively manifests itself that we are
able to say what it is and what its qualities are.And so we find tnat
Fries's Deduction fails entirely of its object.No organic unity is shown
to exist ; scarcely any attempt is made to snow thejinterrelations of tae
several fo^ms of thougnt.Fries is content to show tnat in each tnere is an
element of the unity which is the characteristic of Reason,but he takes no
further steps to enquire into the exhaustiveness of his table of categories
or into the question as to whether they are or are not mutually independent,
-ml. .
or as to whether each is of a like degree of importance and validity.His
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procedure is indeed psychological in tae same way as the search for the
categories is psychological.He start's from the true fact that Reason is a
unity and must unite the particulars of 3sp»ci»a»» perception but the indiw
idual principles are not deduced from the nature of this unity alone nor
co-ordinated into a rational system.What is done seems to be nothing else
than to repeat tne previous examination of the facts from a slightly differ¬
ent point of view.Take e.g. space,which the preliminary analysis has re¬
vealed to be a form of perception ; deduction of this principle consists in
showing tnat it is tne unity in phenomena considered as objective facts ;
simiiarly,-fcime is deduced by showing that it^the unity in the phenomena
considered subjectively.And so through tae whole series : each is "deduced"
when it is shown to be a unifying factor in respect of some general
aspect of experience.Yet it is clear that this does aot really add anything
to tae- ultimate justification of any single principle.lt leaves matters
practically as they were before.That there is an element of unity in each
we mow already since each is a common element abstracted from many partic¬
ulars : what we require further is to know that ail together form a unity.
But that is not shown,and consequently,if there was an empirical element in
the principles derived from analysis,it still remains here.One can merely
say that each of these principles is one actual way in which unity can be
introduced into experience and therefore that each is so far rational.That
the particular principle is purely rational aad therefore necessary is no
more proved by the mere fact of its reference to the Transcendental Unity
tnan it was by the mere fact of its -discovery by analysis.
Nevertheless,although Pries himself fails to make adequate use of it
of
tne principle wnicn lies at tne root of his method is one the very greatest
philosophical importance.It carries us back to the declaration of the ob¬
ject of his enquiry with which he began - to obtain a theory of Reason in
which ail its manifested activities would find their fitting place ;aad we
see in nis "Deduction" an attempt - however unsuccessful - to construct
such a theory.Again,in his conception of the Transcendental and Formal
Apperceptions,it is tne same thought whica finds expression.The Transcend¬
ental Apperception is no longer,as in Kant,equivalent to the barren Ego - a
merely abstract and formal unity - but it is conceived now as a concrete
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whole,embracing in itself ins manifold coatent of experience.Taat is to
say,at these several points Fries consistently,even althoagh it be ancoa^
scioasly,bases nis posijion on ,ne principle that tne test of truth is
systematic unity.The justification of any particular principle involves the
articulation of it along with othef Principles into a system or unity of
tne whole of knowledge.The construction of such a system would answer the
quaestio juris and at the same time would show the relatively smaller im¬
portance of the enquiry concerning tne facts.The latter would only be a
preliminary analysis,giving material for tne real metaphysical enquiry.
After the facts have been surveyed,must come tne judging of the facts and
tne working of the facts into a theory of Reason.The success of the theory
as a philosophical conclusion can be tested then by nothing save by its own
completeness and its ability to show tne fundamental unity of the whole.
Such a method would nave a real claim to be considered superior
to the methods followed by Kant and Begel respectively because it would
include what is valuable in both.On the onorland i-t make3 clear the limits,
of the Transcendental Deduction,which was the kernel of Kant's argument.
really proves no more than is proved by the Friesian aa^ysis'^ofex-
parienoe and it satisfies the ultimate .philosophical demand no better.What
it does succeed in showing is simply that certain principles actually are
involved in one experience wnich we have,that e.g.our ordered world poss¬
esses order only in so far as such a conception as that of cause aad effect
is valid.There is nothing mysterious about it.It is only an enquiry into
facts.It brings no new principle to bear but works out the implications of
an original assumption.Here,therefore,Fries,so far from having misinterpret*
ed Kant,reveals the true significance of Kant's thought and fills in sever-
al of utie gaps left by Kant in the argument.He gives in the Self-Confidence
of Reason the ground for that original assumption and thus justifies the
results of :.ne subsequent enquiry.Indeed it would have been on this ground
quite possible for Pries openly to deolare that no further justification
or deduction of tine principles was necessary than their discovery by ana-
lysis,for the Self-confidence of Reason implies taat a sufficient justific¬
ation of any principle is the fact that it forms an integral aad inseparable
par., of our thought.That is a thing which careful enquiry can establish,
enquiry which it is doubtless difficult to carry through but which is,
nevertheless,akin to a scientific enquiry and may gradually approach a
final and adequate result.A complete theory of Reason does not appear to
be necessary even as a confirmation.The particular categories can be indiv¬
idually established according as one aspect of experience or another- is
examined.Poth "Peduo ion" and "Immediate Knowledge of Reason" seem only to
add needless complications to the procedure and not to give any additional
authority to what is indeed already sufficiently certain.
Nevertheless Pries is right in insisting that this is not the
satisfaction of the highest object of philosophy.So long as we look only to
a particular case,abstracted from other particular cases,and assume that
the analysis in this case aas been thoroughly carried out,we might admit
the validity of the principle thus shown to underlie tnis form of exper¬
ience. Put feue attachment of these two conditions reveals the inadequacy of
the method.Its fault does not lie in what it does but in what it may fail
to do.A merely mathematical addition of one category to another- might be
the beginning of an endless process.Nor does it provide for the difficulty
which always faces philosophers of the Intuitionist school and which seems
23.
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to face Fries no less - that different principles may seem to contradict ee
A.
one ano her and yet both appear to be ultimate.Both of these defects point
to the necessity of a criticism of the categories af^er the first stags of
the enquiry has been performedtin order that the relations of one to the
others and,it may be,the limitation of one by the others may be made clear.
It is here that the method of Hegel's logic must be brought in
to supplement Fries's first position.lt is true that Fries was bitterly
opposed to what he believed to be the Hegelian attitude.He held that mere
thought was empty and could yield nothing more than abstractions ; it could
not evolve out of itself even the bare conceptions of the categories did
it not find the material for forming these conceptions already given to it
in experience ; believing that Hegel tended to mailmen look; upon the enquir
into philosophical principles as independent of experience and concerned
with pure thought alone,he condemned his philosophy.This again is a valid
position and so far as the criticism is applicable jQ Hegel its must be
upheld,It is not possible for the human mind to construct the universe a
priori ; the universe is for us a fact which we have to accept and which we
can only sees to interpret and understand by reflection upon it.This "Self-
confidence" of Reason which is the fundamental principle explicitly adopted
by Fries is the principle which all must accept as their starting-point,viz
that Reason is trustworthy,that whatever a rational man is compelled to
tninx is true.It is this concrete content of the mind that is the philos¬
opher's only datum.Therefore no adequate system or theory can be merely
abstract but must deal with Reason in action ; it cannot b9 separate from
experience but is only the correlate in terms of ^ure thought of what is
more concretely present in the facts of life.The first philosophical duty
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is criticism and analysis ; only after that is theorising justifiable.If
Hegel had attempted the latter without; the former his method would have
been wrong. In so far as Fries ma'xes clear what was undoubtedly left ob¬
scure in Hegel, his condemnation of Hegelianism is to be commended.Yet it
is in Hegel's method that we see the fulfilment of what Fries seems to have
had in view and a real attempt made to construct a system of the rational
principles.Hegel follows the method which Fries ought consistently to have
followed - that of working from tae known facts upwards towards the unity
which is to consist in tne co-ordination of them all.This is the kind of
unity which Fries set before aimself at tne outset of his discussion - a
unity which is a system, in which each category will be placed in its true
relation to ail tne others.The credit of having seen its necessity must be
ascribed to Fries and also that of having shown its place in the whole
enquiry,but he himself did not give any real guidance as to how it was to
be found.It must be admitted that he did not sufficiently realise the im¬
portance of this part of his own method.As an attempt to construct a system
of Pure Reason out of tne aspects of it which are learned from its exercise
in experience,Hegelis thought represents an undoubted advance on that of
Fries,for it is a real contribution towards the fulfilment of that demand
waich Fries only recognised to be fundamental.
I
2. The Doctrine of Idea.3.
The second aspect of the Kantian philosophy- to which Fries attached
himself and to which he gave additional significance is the strain of
Transcendental Idealism which exists in the Critique of Pure Reason.It may
again be said that in laying too much stress on this,just as in giving the
Critique a psychological interpretation , Pries was in reality causing Kant
to be misunderstood,but hers as there he did not merely claim the authority
of Kant for his theory but also endeavoured to show that it was the reason¬
able outcome of the Critical Philosophy.In the Doctrines of' Ideas he found
a real and satisfying substitute for the larger speculations of other more
ambitious systems.It enabled him to breaK through the limitations imposed
on Knowledge by sensuous experience and to come into real contact with
infinities.
It may be recalled that in Kant's view these Ideas of Pure Reason -
the Ideas of Cod,of Freedom and of the Soul - were from the speculative
aspect purely theoretical and subjective constructions.Hs saw that they
arose necessarily in every individual Reason,yet he represented them only a
limiting conceptions which the mind could not but form but which had no
claim to be regarded as realities.They stood for Kant on quite a different
platform from the categories.The latter formed an essential part of actual
experience and therefore were valid;but the Ideas by their very nature
could never be found in any concrete experience and therefore could never
was
be established on the basis of this - Kant's only criterion.lt %% only in
the Critique of Practical Reason,as postulates of morality,that Kant was
able to ascribe to them a certain degree of reality,but the value of this
23.
conclusion greatly lesseaed by the failure of the Speculative Reason to
give to it any firm sapport.lt is this deficiency which Fries wasable ^
to do something to meet.
Fries defined an Idea *as a presentation which cannot be de<*.
scribed in definite statements,bat althoagh it was thas 9x hypothesi ex¬
cluded from ever appearing in experience (used in Kant's sense of the word)
yet Fries did not reel compelled to ascribe to it merely subjective import¬
ance. It was possible for him to do otherwise becaase he had abandoned the
original criterion whica Kant ased and no longer accepted experience as an
independent and exhaastiv3 test of train.As we have seea,experience was for
him a test - whatever i3 essential to it is valid - bat not th3 only test;
trath may be a mach larger thing than ws can discover from seasaoas exper¬
ience alone and the Ideas may still represent realities even althoagh they
can never be presented in a definite experience.Here the value of the
Friesian method and the limitation of the Kantian come oat still more dis¬
tinctly. Fries' s fundamental position enabled him to re-interpret the whole
of Kant's discission of the Antinomies of Pars Reason and to develop the
conclusions in a mach more valuable direction.
In the verbal statement of the Antinomies Fries and his follow¬
ers hold closely to Kant,working oat Thesis and Antithesis in almost ident¬
ical terms,bat,as regards the meaning and significance attached to tne
words,they differ from him fandamentaily.They recognise that Kant's method
of stating these antinomies is open to the objection of being little more
than a tissae of logical fallacies and tdat ta9 contradictions whicn he
finds are not ultimately contradictions at all.They are only apparently
such;in reality thesis and antithesis are dealing with different things -
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the one with things-ia-themseives, the other with phenomena - a distinction
which has been tacitly introduced into the preaaises.lt is only of things-
in-themselvss that it may be true to say that the sum-total of the condit¬
ions of an^givea "conditioned" must be complete.Of phenomena it cannot poss
ibly be true,since the complete series^f conditions can never be given
either in time or in space.There is,therefore,no real problem in the matter
of the Antinomies.The whole difficulty seems to vanish in the assumption
of the distinction between phenomena and things-ia-themselves.
.But iir appears again as soon as we enquire into the authority
A
which Kant had for assuming this distinction.The Eriesians maintain with
justice that this authority is wholly inadequate.On the one hand it rests
oa the unjustifiable conclusion from the a priority of space and time to
the subjectivity of everything that falls under these forms;and on the
other hand on tne underlying assumption of causal relation between the
object of Knowledge and tne subjective apprehension of it.The former posit¬
ion is obviously invalid and tne ffriesians argue that tihe latter is not
less so. Examination of the nature of Knowledge will show the impossibility
of any causal relation to anything outside of itself for even if such a
relation did exist it could not be Known.There is nothing in sensuous exper
ience,considered as such,which gives us any right to say that the objects
which ws see are hot the ultimate realities.They are a necessity of thought
and therefore,in so far as they are consistent with one another,their
truth is established.Kant has not shown any good reason for affirming that
the world of phenomena is different from and subordinate to the world of
things-ia-themselves,and there seems to remain for him no ground for the
introduction of Transcendental Idealism.
As criticism of Kant these considerations are aot witnoat their
value bat taeir chief importance hers is that they define for as the point
of view from wnich Fries takes up the consideration of the antinomies.Be¬
fore this point in his system there has been nothing to make as think that
we have not been dealing all the time with ultimate realities.We have rest¬
ed on the innate certainty of Reason that it can reach truth and have there¬
fore accepted as true whatever careful enquiry showed to be bound up with
the exercise of Reason.And on this ground we have been led to recognise
the reality of the forms of sense and of the categories,as well as of the
'
particular facts.At this stage such a theory seems quite adequate and no
evidence has been afforded which would lead to a distinction between phen¬
omena and things-ia-themselves.
The necessity for the distinction arises because Reason cannot
rest at this stage but must press on towards the complete unity of know¬
ledge. It is when the attempt is made to reach this that the antinomies
appear and they are not now fallacious conclusions of the Reason exercis¬
ing itself in regions wnere it has no jurisdiction but represent real con¬
tradictions which arise within sensuous experience if it be considered as
the highest knowledge that human reason can reach.Reason demands that the
ultimate reality,the complete whole of knowledge,should be perfect and self-
contained, not dependent on anything outside of itself but entirely self-ex¬
planatory and free from conditions.On examination,however,it finds that
sensuous experience ioe^not at all correspond with this ideal,that it is im
possible to find within it any complete whole whatever but always only a
regression from one conditioned being to another.lt aevar is possible to
jt
reaoh either a first cause or the conception of the totality of tnings.
a
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T'tiere is hers a contradiction which is real and not illusory between the
schematised categories and the principle of "Completeness"; and this is sur¬
mountable only if we coaclnde that in the knowledge which we reach under
the forms of space and time we do not obtain the ultimate reality but only
an incomplete appearance of it.
This section of the friesiaa philosophy is based,therefore,on this
"Principle of Completeness",which is brought forward as the highest and most
authoritative concept in tne whole system. We must, therefore,seek: to examine
its meaning and tne source of this authority which it claims.The ground on
which it rests is well stated by Apelt in the following passage."The Ide^f
the Absolute is the most fundamental idea in Season,the highest link: in the
whole chain of our knowledge.Although in the world of sense no object cor¬
responding to it ever can be given,yet some reality,even if it be still in¬
comprehensible for us,must belong to it.for the proposition that every
"conditioned" can have its ultimate ground only in the "unconditioned" is
as immediately certain as the one tnat each "conditioned" must be based on
a particular ground.from tnat,however,it follows tnat if anything whatever
exists as conditioned,the unconditioned must likewise exi3t.The conviction
of tne truth and objective validity of this idea is therefore most closely
bound up with the faith in the truthfulness of our Reason.We must declare
our own Reason to be a liar if the Idea of the Absolute is to be nothing
else than a phantom.As certainly as we believe in tne truth of our percept¬
ions, as certainly as we are convinced of the reality of the things,so cer¬
tainly must there belong to the Idea of the Absolute a reaiity,9vea if it
be a superseasual one". " Tne principle of Completeness is ultimately noth¬
ing else than the original conception of tne Pure Reason applied to tne con-
teat, of oar knowledge". (Apelt - Metaphysik pp. 331-2).
These passages take as back again t.o the general method which
Fries adopted and here,as there, there are two lines along which tie may
be interpreted.lt, may be said,on the one hand,that this is a merely psych¬
ological. consideration which he adduces,or that it is not at ail different
from the subjective necessity which Kant admitted to exist of seeking for a
totality of particular conditions.As such,and as a statement of a merely
subjective fact,it would obviously not prove anything as to the validity or
authority of" th^conception.Nor does the statement that the reality of the
unconditioned is immediately certain carry weight. The self-confidence of
Reason which alone certifies that there is such a thing as certainty is. a
confidence not in any detached part of its activity but in itself as a
whole.Immediate knowledge has been seen already to be a mere hypothesis as
applied to particular principles;the only knowledge tnat is immediately and
ultimately certain,.that cannot in any way be proved but must be left to the
individual conviction of every man, is that he is capable by the exercise
of thought of reaching a system of truth.
Put,on the other hand,the argument represented by the above
quotation may be interpreted as an attempt to establish an essential connect
ion between the Principle of Completeness and that of the Self-confidence
of Reason and it is along this line that its true significance will be found
to lie.T-he fact that the unconditioned must exist if the conditioned exists
is not an immediate intuition nor an individual belief,but is "bound up with
the faith in our own Reason"..Truth must be a necessary unity and the very
faith in the existence of truth implies a similar faith in the existence of
a complete unity which is the object of true knowledge,If we do not find
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this presented to as ia experience that does aot detract from the reality
of the idea,for experience is nob an independent and absolute criterion.We
may learn from its deficiencies as well as from its positive content.Its
$alaeSi£llsiipiy that it reveals to as the natare of certain necessary con-
cept-e of Reason. It does not. give to them their necessity bat, simply reveals
them to as as necessary.There may quite well be other: means beyond the
facts which experience suppliers with whereby an equally rational necessity
may be shown to belong^the conceptions which we form of the Ideas or of the'
Absolute.The unities of Transcendental and Formal Apperception have already
brought; ;,p view the position which Sehmid expressly states and which is a
true position, that "unity is the highest law of truth".In accordance with
this it is a valid conclusion which is come to that whatever conception is
necessary in order tp state the unity which is. the ultimate object of know¬
ledge must be valid as a statement referring to reality.
The conceptions which Fries finds thus justified are the< Ideas of
Grod,of Freedom and of the' Soul/, but In spite of the objective validity which
t.hey are assigned they do not become possessed of any very concrete reality.
They are limiting conceptions and can only be stated negatively In terms.of
finite things ; we are able to state that they are but aot what they are ;
we have no positive knowledge of their c-ont.ent, but only of what they are
not,because all positive statements are confined within,the limits of the<
forms of space and time and it is beyond these that the content of the-
Ideas lies.The Idea of Freedom e.g.represents the! totality of the regress¬
ion in the causal series which complete truth demands. So,mewhere the causal
series must end in a cause which is not at the' same time an effectjthat is.
to say,there must exist somehow as the origin of all things a free cause not
determined nor defined by the laws of mechanical causation.As to the nature
such a free cause we can,however,say nothing.The forms of the judgment
are* limited and applicable only to the objects of sensuous experience and
reflection upon them,whereas a free cause is incapable, by its very definit¬
ion of being presented in experience.lt is at variance essentially with the
conceptions both of space and of time;and contradicts th.9: nature of botn.
Anything which has tempral limits - a beginning or an end - must be causally
related to its temporal antecedents and consequents.But a free cause has no
causal relation to any antecedent events, or states,but is itself an original
beginning; and therefore- a free cause is incapable of becoming an object of
sensuous experience which is always at least ompraity,if not also spacially,
conditioned.Still less can the- Idea of Sod receive any positive! content.lt
is indeed nothing else- than the abstract,though necessary,conception of a
necessary Peiag which is the ground and cause- of the unity of the- world.
Everything that is presented in our experience contains an element of con¬
tingency in it tjhat is simply given.The laws of the objective world them¬
selves are only abstractions except as they are based in some necessary
Being which is above them and which is their source.It is impossible,there¬
fore, that. such a Being should be- capable* of being presented to the mind in a
positive way through these laws or through the sensuous experience.The only
metnod that we can follow in saying anything about it, is that we should
negate all possible limitations.So also with the third Idea,that of the Soul
as the* unity that is not further divisible. This Tries holds to be necess¬
ary as the totality in the procedure of analysis.The idea of an ultimate
division is a necessary one but Is unrealizable in space.Nevertheless there
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is a difference between this Idea and trie others, in which we can see a
suggestion of a further development of the theory.Abstractly the Idea of
the souljis only a limiting conception and cannot fall under any of the
positive concepts formed by the understanding,but in our own self-conscious,
ness we are said to have actual experience of it as an ultimate unity,
individual and self-dependent.lt; is true that this experience is not. real
Knowledge which we can state in words.Yet,if not Knowledge in the ordinary
sense of tfie word, it is clear that it is a certain faculty by which we can
reach truth since otherwise we should have no ground for making the ident¬
ification between the Idea and- the simple substance.We shall find that this,
other faculty of Reason has an important function to fulfil in the develop¬
ment of the- system.
In the meantime, however, we have to admit the* truth of Pries's positri
ion with regard to the* general statement that these absolute Xdeas cannot
be found either in,or in terms of,the world of nature or of the senses.The
causal nexus is only a series of relations of particulars to each other and
cannot be thought without limitation.Into such a series the absolute or
infinite cannot enter. They are in inevitable* contradiction the* one with the
other.And it is true* also that this is a sufficient proof,if any were need¬
ed, that the world of the-senses is not absolutely real,that to space and
time and all that is known under these forms only a subordinate degree of
reality belongs at t,he most.Truth must be a unity and anything that is
essentially at variance with the idea of unity cannot be t,he ultimate truth,
It is not unnatural, however, that t.his conclusion should have given
rise to several questions with reference to the* legitimacy of ascribing
only a subordinate value to sensuous experience.The first is one which
has been raised by Professor Cassirir who argues that by this procedure-
the- fundamental position from which the system set out has been abandoned.
It seems that we are no longer able to place confidence in our own treason.
At tjhe- outset it was maintained that the intuition of the senses was'an
immediate source of knowledge,immediately certain because of Reason's
confidence in its own powers,whereas now it is maintained that by means of
this no knowledge of ultimate reality can be obtained at ail.The Self-confic
enc-e of Reason seems to have been entirely illusory.The criticism here
made is entirely valid if we confine ourselves to the form of pries's ar¬
gument. It is undoubtedly the-case that he (along with Apelt. and Nelson):
does maintain that fc,he certainty of the sensuous perception is as great as,
trough of a different kind from,the immediate knowledge of Reason which
gives us the categories and ultimately the- ideas of Pure Reason.The two are
species of the- one characteristic of Reason,that of being able immediately'
to reach truth or: reality.Hence it is an inconsistency that later these two
equally authoritative sources of truth should come into conflict.Neverthe¬
less it does not seem to be a fatal inconsistency since the original belief
that, the self-confidence of Reason implied the immediate- certainty of every
sensation was certainly not justifiable on pries's own principles.In any
case it c-ouid wl»y be true of the man whose faculties were normal that his
sensations were entirely trustworthy.For a colour-blind man,for example, the-
immediate knowledge of red or of green would not be a t^uth,i.e.it would
not be universally valid. It; is true that Pries holds that it is only within
the results of reflection that 9rror may appear, that b.hs1 sensation which is
reflected upon is always immediately certain and incapable of error) and so
far as this is merely a statement that in all perception some truth or
other is the object of it, it is of coarse valid; bat in any further sense
th^fac-ts make' it plain that there is no sach infallible facalty in the
numan mind. Psychologically it; is not; possible except by an arbitrary ab- :•
stractjion to separate sensation and reflection..In all sensation which con¬
veys any meaning to the mind the understanding or reflective facalty has
been at wort.A pare sensation is a myth and Fries's infallible facalty of
Knowledge is closely akin to this myth.Nothing that comes to oar knowledge
nas not been shaped and transformed by the' activities of the^ anderstanding,
Although for. t.h9' c-ont,ent of' what we know we are dependent on what comes to
as from another source than oar own spontaneity,yet; the form so interpene¬
trates the matter that what we perceive is even at ojhe first oar own con¬
struction. If truth were to be measured merely negatively by the absence of
error,there would be some justification for Fries's view bat then the- great¬
est abstraction would be as true as the fullest conception of reality.Hence'
if we have' been right in interpreting Fries's own conception of truth as
the complete system or unity of things,this criterion of "immediate certain¬
ty "is in reality out of place.Truth will lie,in accordance with the truer
interpretation,not at the beginning but at the1 end of our search.That our
perceptual Knowledge gets somehow into contact with reality we^ have1 to
assume simply because it is knowledge,but it lies with reflection tp reveal
to us the degree and tae nature of the relation which the particulars bear
to the whole.
A similar and parallel misconception is found in the distinction
wnich is drawn^between a 'proposition and its content - a distinction which
again is possible only if-one'is dealing with abstractions.Abstractly it
may be possible to say that phs proposition "Socrates is a man"is only the
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arbitrary anion of two concepts and different from "The. proposition that
Socrates is a man is true", bat as a matt.er of concrete fact, an affirmation
of reality is an inseparable aspect of every judgment.The origin of both
misconceptions is doubtless psychological and serves again to illustrate
the fact that in spite of precautions Fries was not able to prevent his
psychological method from injuring t.he purity of his philosophy.There is a
possibility of regarding either judgment, or perception simply as a fact in t
the< stream of consciousness and of distinguishing from this the. importance
of the fact, as a vehicle of knowledge.Put the two are not distinct and separ
able things which can be set side by side and compared,but are simply the.
same thing looked at from different points of view; and for the purposes of
the second attitude the first is of little value.States of consciousness as
such have almost, as little to do with metaphysics as has the' mechanism of
a watch wit.h the significance of the hours.The one point of importance in
them is their ability to convey knowledge of the truth and there is no
generic distinction between different Kinds of Knowledge in this respect.As
regards the method by which Knowledge is obtained large differences are
possible - it may come through sensation or through reflection upon sensat¬
ion - and as regards the form in which Knowledge is stated similar differ¬
ences are possible,but the oontpnt is always clearly separable from these
psychological accidents and it is always a direct affirmation of reality,
comparable only with itself.Immediate Knowledge is not an entity bub is an
attempt, to state, a logical parallel to the- psychological abstraction of
sensation.So far from immediate Knowledge being the only certain source of
truth, it. is itself a sheer abstraction; between sensation and reflection thei
distinction is not of Kind but only of degree.Sensation can give nothing to
consciousness except, as in it is exercised the same; conscious activity as
is exercised in reflection - th^/aotivity of tjieuanderstjanding or of thought
- and therefore the criterion of validity is one and one only,the unity of
sensation,reflection and Ideas in one system of the; whole of truth.This
alone is essential to the method which we have found to be. that of Tries.
If we thus restore consistency to Tries!s argument and seek: to
justify his philosophical method,we must face another and larger problem -
whether instead of having reached in his Ideas the unity which was sought
for we nave not rather introduced intp knowledge a cleft of such a nature
as to produce an absolute dualism.The; world of Understanding seems in irr:esi~
concilable contradiction with that of the Ideas and the two worlds stand
apart,apparently united by nothing that is. common to both.The world of
Ideas cannot be characterised by anything taken from the finite world nor **
can any relation of the finite; world to that, of the complete reality be
. *'tT^ - f
known.Can both of them belong: to the same whole of truth?£etween the absol-
'A
ute and the finite tnere is a gap that we are quits; unable to cross by any
amount of thought.Instead of reaching a unity we^ seem rather to have shown
that such a unity is impossible of attainment.lt is a mere abstract ideal
that we have- obtained.We can objectify the bare conviction that truth
exists,but of the; positive content of this object we remain absolutely ig¬
norant with the exception that we can know that no limited conception can
be applied to reality.Is not this result the direct opposite of what was
aimed at?Ins.tead of finding the unity that will co-ordinate all our know¬
ledge we; have learned that there is no unity in the knowledge that we have
and that none can b9 discovered.
It is as the solution of this difficulty that Transcendental Ideal-
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ism is in&roduoed and t.he world of appearance distinguished from the real
world.The finite things of which we have knowledge are not ultimate real¬
ities. Bach of them can be known only as existing both in space; and time and
each partjakes therefore of the "unreality"of tjae-se forms. Mot because they
\
are a priori forms,but because they involve an essential contradiction ,we
are bound to deny to space and time and ail that is known under them the
claim to be things-in-themselves.Vet it is not necessary to say that this
knowledge is therefore valueless.lt is not wholly illusion but has a cer¬
tain relation to the "eternal" world.The things-that we see and hear are
the appearances of the things-in-themselves as they manifest themselves
through the veil of space- and time. We see only"through a glass darkly"- but
the glass allows something of the reality to come through.
That this must in some sense be true- is clear^ for we cannot get
away from tne original position that we. have simply to accept the fact that
ac¬
knowledge is ^reality. We have, seen that this does not imply an assumption
that, tne knowledge of the particular: facts is ultimate.lt leaves us with
perfect liberty to criticise it and point out its limitations,if such
exist,but it does imply that no real experience can be- wholly untrus.The
same Reason which is the source- of the- Ideas and which demands the existence
of an intelligible world is active in every experience that we have-. Sensuous
knowledge may be very partial and imperfect knowledge;it may be possible
to transcend it and reach something mor9 adequate; but .just because it is a
necessary product of Reason it must in some degree be true.To deny this
would be to proclaim Reason, itse-lf to be untrustworthy and to fall into the-





The language in which. Fries describes the significance of this
knowledge does little, however, to show its real oaeaning. lt is clearly only
the language of metaphor and does no more than say that some relation or
other exists between the knowledge of the understanding and the objects in
the sphere of the eternal realities.Put we cannot rest content with this.
f<hei tasx of philosophy has not been properly attempted unless a serious,
effort has been made* to show the positive relation which must exist between
the* two spheres.between the reality of the two tnere can be no ultimate
distinction.In terms of the understanding it is impossible to describe
positively the nature of the hignest unities of thought but, these terms
give to us one aspect - even although it may be a subordinate one - of the
same reality.Their inadequacy doss not exclude the possibility that t;hsre.
may be higher aspects in thai world' of experience than the' spacial or tem¬
poral and that these may give the basis for a unity which is still a unity
of t,he positive facts which the senses bring to as and not: merely a unity
abstracted from them.
Suggestions towards such a solution are' given by Fries in the
third part of nis system which we shall discuss - the1 doctrine' of Ahndung
and its significance for: the' philosophy of religion, but; before proceeding
to the discussion of this we must complete the' account of the Ideas by
referring to tne definitions which they receive, from ethical considerations,
In the. Critique of Practical Reason. Fries follows Sant again in the. main
principles but modifies and devslopes the scope of their reference'. He finds,
that, the supreme ethical law is that, of "End" but instead of leaving this
a purely negative and abstract conception, he att.empts to give, it a posit-
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content by identifying the nature of tjhat which is an end-in-it,self with
"personal worth". Again, however:,these' conceptions cannot, he- says, ho ■ roaMacd
£^bt:iL*4L, jjLSdU-UL.
be realised in the finite world; personal value cannot be defined without^"
A
adulterafced with conceptions that are of purely empirical origin; and t,he 4
end-in-itself is never actually known in experience except in the< abstract
way of being recognised as the: supreme law,of the practical reason and ee#
source of th© categorical imperat,ive.3oth conceptions belong strictly to
the' world of absolute reality and yet are' mo~® than merely negative in
A
their significance for t,he interpretation of experience. Is get through
them a positive characteristic of t,he things-in-themselves which we could
not get on theoretical grounds alone.The absolute idea of 3od as the unity
and source of all things must itself be defined by this law of personal
value whose validity is for Reason absolute,and thus the Idea becomes
known to us as t.ne highest possible realisation of personal worth, as tne
Being who is infinitely and eternally good:the Ideas of the soul and of
freedom are likewise given a new meaning when they are shown to be' posit¬
ively assumed in the ethical life instaad of being,as in the<theoretical
consideration,only last conclusions.
Without; entering into a discussion of the: intrinsic value of the
ethic of Fries,it. may be pointed out that the line of thought which he<
follows here is at once consistent and justifiable.lt avoids,to some extent
at least,the cleavage which was made by Kant between the' speculative and
the: practical spheres.The argument that ultimately the' practical postulates
are identical with the Ideas is calculated to show that one unity runs
through all and to prepare' the' way for a solution of the apparent diffic¬
ulty of allowing moral acts to find a place in a world that is under the
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law of causation.Not that this difficulty is entirely solved, for Pries like
Kant tended to believe that the world of moral action was different from
the woria of cause and effect, but, nevertheless:, the justification of'the
ethical postulates as the law of all being is a large step in this direct¬
ion. And Pries's. justification seems to be a valid one. It. is not merely a
case of identifying two results drawn from different quarters and possess¬
ing a certain similarity,nor is it a case of unduly exalting the authority
of the ethical.The ground for: the conclusion that the Ethical Idea is the
supreme law of reality - practical and speculative. - is: simply the* funda¬
mental principle, on which our whole theory o^/truth is based. The law of
"Completeness",of unity or system,must in every aspect of truth be. satis¬
fied and as there, can be but one rational unity everything absolute must in
the end be one.The' ideas of Pure Reason are. positive, entities which exist
as the unity of ail that is thought in a speculative or scientific respect
and the Ideas of the Practical Reason are the unifying and rationalising
"fid Ire j 9^*-etso v
factor in the practical experience, jjjapfa demand/! that certain character**^
should belong to the
absolute reality and since, it is the one Reason that
is at work, in both,froth demands must be valid since truth is: nothing more
than tne unity of all rational thought.
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The philosophical problem has now modified itjself as a result of
these conclusions to something like this form - how this unity is to be
shown actually to exist in the experience which we. possess.The Absolute
Idea is so far largely a negation - it, is the unknown, and unknowable
source and cause of all things which is at the 3ame< time. the. absolute end-
in-itself and therefore that which is supremely good.Put the relation of'
this to the world has been shown to be< a problem which cannot remain un¬
solved without a large gap being left in the philosophical system.What the
world of senses is. and what is itjs positive significance is perhaps the* »uni*i
question of most practical and'also most speculative importance,and this,
nas not been neglected by Fries. He is not. content, as we have seen,to leave'
tne matter in the purely negative condition in which ibj was left by fCant,«M
nor does he leave it in the negative condition of the first section of his
own theory. His dootpine of Ahndung (premonition or intuition).gives his
account of the' relation which exists between tne two realms of t.hought and
gives,as seems to us,lines for a satisfactory conclusion.
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3.Doctrine of Ahndung.
In this section of his writings Fries again follows Kant in the
central principles, while at the same time- he attempts to pat a wider mean¬
ing into them. It is to the Critique of Judgment that he attaches himself
here,accepting Kant's analysis of the facts but holding that this gives a
basis for large metaphysical conclusions such as Kant did not feel himself
entitled to draw.The aesthetic jusgment is held by Fries to be the' means
by which we become conscious of the eternal world behind the world of the
senses and ultimately is regarded as. a principle' of Knowledge no less valid
than the' ordinary judgments of the understanding.This position is,moreover,,
not merely a theory adopted in order that escape* may be found from the' limii
itat.iorie of the1 understanding,but it is,like* all his other positions,forced
upon Fries by his reading of the facts.The aesthetic judgment - our exper¬
ience of the beautiful and the sublime - is not merely a subj*ective feel¬
ing : to regard it as such is a purely arbitrary proceeding.In reality,as.
Fries recognises,it claims objective validity just as the judgments of
science do and with just as great a degree of apparent! authority.fhat may
V.
be called synthetic judgments a priori exist in this sphere also : canons
of taste are formed to which it is agreed that everyone' ought to submit
their personal judgments : and it is. held possible to educate the* taste of
others - to teach them what actually ought bp be approved.Kant refused to
ascribe this objective validity to the aesthetic judgment for tjhe< same*
reason as led him to regard the* Ideas as merely regulative- principles -
because they could not be presented as part of a concrete- experience - but
we nave already seen that t.his reason is insufficient, fe cannot lay arbit-
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rary bounds to the extent of experience;sensuous experience* does not ex-
naust reality and there may,therefore, be other ways, of coming into contact
with it. In accordance with Pries's fundamental position that tjhe only
critique' of reason possible is an immanent one,the actual existence of b.he
aesthetic judgment} as a distinct function of Season establishes its validity
LL
provided that the principles on which a careful analysis finds it b,o be
based are not inconsistent with the* other rational principles.
This analysis brings Pries to the conclusion that what is always
implied in the aesthetic judgment is the discovery of a peculiar mind of
unity existing in different particulars,and this leads to a more far-reach¬
ing conclusion. Unities of this itind are unknown in the world of space and
time : the very nature of tness forms excludes them : and therefore the
truths which the' aesthetic judgment brings to light cannot be; truths
about this realm of things.On the ot,her hand, it is the very characteristic
which we> found to belong to the things-in-t.hemselves which is peculiar to
the> aesthetic judgment.The conception of end is valid of the* ultimate real-
ies and the conception of end includes the conception of unity in differ¬
ence. Here then is a point in our experience' at which the- nature' of the*
eternal world touches us.The' relation between appearance and things-in-
Ljhemselves which was formerly but a doubtful and almost unmeaning statement
becomes now filled with meaning.lt is no longer »a mere statement t.hat t,he
two spheres are essentially one but t,heir unity is now realised.In this
particular form of consciousness we have a "feeling" or an "intuition" or
a "premonition" of c.(h3 presence of an element of the' eternal in the finite,
and it. becomes clear hhat so far from the1 two spheres being in contradict¬
ion with each other, they are United together in an indivisible harmony.
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Pries uses the* word "feeling" very commonly to describe the exper¬
ience ojW aest.het.ic judgment and,with bis usual psychological bias, he is
inclined to look for the explanation of tne existence of t.his faculty in
the psychological analysis of the human mind int.o t;he three elements of
cognition,volition and feeling - two being represented in the1 speculative
and practical activity, t,he> t,hird being the mental element active here.But
he finds it necessary in so doing to re-define what he intends to convey
by the word "feeling" and consciously differentiates its meaning in the
present, usage from the significance which is usually attached to it.Thus
it comes to lose much of the point; of its association with, the psychologic¬
al division of mental activity.Peeling,properly speaking, is either pleasure
or pain but Pries explains that it is not, t.he- merevfeeling-tone of the
conscious state of wnich he is speaking here.He intends to use "feeling" in
a sense to which , as he thinks, the< name is more appropriate, and it becomes
practically equivalent to a third kind of knowledge'.
It, is,however,necessary to understand that between this and the other
kinds of knowledge t;here is a fundamental difference. Although, it will be
remembered,immediate knowledge was not; supposed to oome at first into con¬
sciousness in the form of definite propositions, it could nevertheless
always be put in'; o such forms,and all the knowledge of reflection could sim¬
ilarly be put into adequate statements.Put this feeling or intuition oannot
be expressed in words.Tne categories of tne understanding are aot adequate
to contain this experience for they cannot rise above what is limited and
particular.Hence,properly speaking,it is not possible to communicate these
intuitions from one individual to anotner.'They may to some extent be de¬
scribed by analogies taken from experiences of tne finite,but these cannot
convey the true nature of &m- experience.Nothing that oaa be given extera-
al or material shape in the form of words or pictures or in any other way
oaa convey the nat'ire of that which is essentially other than matter. An
intuition must itself be experienced to be known.All that words can hope to
do is to guide another to look in the proper direction for the experience
and to some extent to open his eyes to the existence of the infinite,bat
ant.il his eyes are opened the words themselves cannot present a reality to
him. The reality transcends tae words and is in its very nature inexpress-
ibie.
Again there seems to be trabh in this bat it seems also trae that
in following oat this argument Fries has,for the time at least,practically
given ap his own method of scientific analysis and enquiry and has attacked
the subject from the \ priori point of view.It is really an unwarranted
assamption on his part that gives rise to this doctrine of the inexpressib-
ility of aesthetic judgments or of any judgments other than those about
sensible things. The question as to whetner such jadgmeats are or are not
capable of being expressed does not seem to have been considered.-It seems
much rather to be the case that the question as to the capacity of numan
thought,and language as its^xpression,has been prejudged and that upon an
inadequate ground.
The ground upon which the view rests is tne conviction thai
tne logical forms of tae judgment exhaust the universal principles which
are capable of being formulated.Fries,like &aat,tacitly assumes/this-The
valid categories are for him simply the forms of judgment.But this assump¬
tion is manifestly unjusfeifiable.lt, is impossible feo conclude from the
purely formal analysis of the judgment that the whole of the rational and
47.
universal principles have been discovered through that analysis alone.As
we nave seen,the test for the validity of any category is in the first
instance its actuality,and therefore unless the formal analysis agrees
with an analysis of concrete experience its authority is void.Tne judgment
is only an abstraction from the concrete fehought and the categories are not
primarily itjs forms bub are the various conceptions, which the Season uses
in thinking the experience which it. has. Hence in itjself the logical form
has no authority : what gives it authority is tae fact that it is funda¬
mentally involved in the experience which we possess so that without it
experience in some aspeot of it would be self-confradiotory or impossible.
From t.his point of view,therefore,it becomes clear that justice has
scarcely been done to the significance of t;na aesthetic judgment and the
intiuition of ultimate reality which it conveys. Fries ought to have taken
this simply as one aspect of the whole of rational experience which he was
engaged in theorising,and ought to have considered it exactly as the other
aspects.Had he followed this method he would have bean bound to conclude
that the categories which he had obtained so far were not adequate to the
reality which actually eaters within tae sphere of rational thought but
that there must be some higher category by means of which could be express¬
ed the higher truths.Between the category of end and those of cause,sub¬
stance etc.there is no dififerende as regards the degree of objectivity to
be ascribed to them,provided that all are alike necessary in order to give
full expression to the experience which we have ; and it would seem again
to have been a psychological preconception that caused Friesjto make the
distinctions between them.Tae question for the critical examination of know¬
ledge is whether the categories of cause and of reciprocity are adequate
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to describe all that we are compelled to think or whether they fall short
and leave something unaccounted for.
The discussion of the antinomies of Pure Season has shown us
that these categories cannot exhaust the content of any particular exper¬
ience. The contradictions which they, reveal to be implied .in the attempt to
thine tne world in space and" time as.an, absolute- unity prove not only that
tnat world as a. whole-is not the.':complete 'and- ultimate reality, but also
that no particular thing can at tnis stage be adequately known^since its
place in that ultimate reality remains obscure.After everything has been
said a^outp-*£^'haia^heCategories of the understanding can say,there re¬
mains something more to be learned,some higher aspect more adequately
descriptive of its nature as part of a whole.
In the ethical life we have one illustration or proof of tne exist¬
ence of such nigher aspects of reality.Mechanism,properly speaking,is never
the nature of mental process but it is easier to see tnis in the c-ase of
the moral 3ven than in that of the intellectual life.The distinction of
good and bad,apart from the reality of which our whole experience would b3
utterly irrational,is impossible unless there be more in self-conscious
life than the mechanical interaction of causes and effects.This,however,
applies only to persons and,although it prepares the way for the discovery
of other methods by which the merely mechanical is transcended,it does not
itself provide them.Put tjhe aesthetic judgment possesses an authority of
the same degree as the moral and scientific judgments - it is a necessity
of oar experience - and yet it directs itself towards the particular ob¬
jects of the material world.The higher aspects of their nature which it
reaches have exactly the same claim to be considered real as the more pure^,
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sensible aspects. It, is impossible therefore to draw a line between the two
spheres of reality.If the object of the aesthetic judgment is to be ident¬
ified with the nature of the sternal realities, it must be identified no
less with the nature of particular facts.The same unity is present in both
and it is unit y which on the analogy of other experience we should expect
to be able t.o state. »
Pries,however,holds firmly to its inexpressibility and this
(
indeed is the point most insisted on in his whole account; of religion,
which finds its place in the system here.The religious experience is the
most important and probably the most common case of the aesthetic judgment.
It is essentially an intuition of the eternal in and through the finite.The
eternal objects to which it looks are realities,as has been established in
tne Doctrine of Ideas,yet the intuition does not bring any real knowledge
of tnese realities.lt is far more nearly akin to feeling than to knowledge.
To be known it must be experienced.Beyond the abstract and barren theory of
the Ideas there i3 no part of the religious experience that can become
common property.It, is always contained in individual feelings which baffle
description.
These views may be criticised along two lines.In tne first place
it may be argued that Pries himself does not consistently hold to nis posit¬
ion tnat the feelings and the objects of them are indescribable,and second¬
ly it must be maintained that the conception of religion with which Pries
works is not the highest conception.These considerations will lead us to a
restatement of th9 relation of religion to tne philosophical position which
we have been developing.
The former criticism is justified by the way in which Prie3
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deyalop9s his account of religion,He is not content to leave it merely as
something individual and unique but it is the boast of Sohmid,for example ,
that it is possible foe fries to give a much mora complete acoount of relig¬
ion than Schleiermacher had given.Sohieiermacher had reduced all to one
unique experience - the feeling of absolute dependence - but fries,while
recognising the truth of this as emblement, had not only denied its ade¬
quacy as a complete account of religion but had distinguished other aspects,
In particular he found that the religious feelings are three in number,
centring not only in dependence on the- Infinity but also in the assertion
of tiie independence of tne human individual.Tie individual is aot^aerely
passive but aiso active in religion and this twofold attitude is revealed
in the existence of tne distinct religious feelings of "devotion", "resign¬
ation" or "submission",and"inspiration",where the two factors,the finite
and the infinite,are differently related to each other.But in thus admitt¬
ing that distinctions are possible in such a realm,has the step not been
ta'xea which must bring tne object of religion within the reach of descript¬
ion and analysis?A difference in tne religious feeling implies that a differ
ent aspect of tne> ultimate reality has come into contact with the individ¬
ual mind,and in tne mere statement of the difference some reference to the
cause of it is inevitably implied.Where distinction is possible some degree
of definition must be possible too.granting,as Fries does grant,that these
types of religious feeling are not due uO individual variations in persons
but tnat they are common to every normal rational being,it seems impossible
to avoid the conclusion that at least three characteristics of the Divine
are xaowable - the facts of His government of the world,of His control of
numan life and destiny and of His moral supremacy as the ethical ideal over
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all that is opposed.
That does not amount to very much bat it shows that it is necess-
ary in some way to transform the conception which Fries has formed of re¬
ligion. The religions feeling is not a blind passivity which merely suffers
itself to be aronsed irrespective of the nature of tnat which arouses it,
bat it is an active state of the mind which lays hold of tne object and
fashions itself according to that which it finds.This analysis,if it be
true,would seem to imply that the religions experience always includes a
claim to possess an element of knowledge to which it is ia itjs complete '
form a personal response.The knowledge may not lie on the surface bat its
presence is implied.Religion is not,like mere feeling,a purely inward ex¬
perience. It is far rather true to say that it always looks outjward like
perception and thought,and claims to reach contact with reality.lt is never
satisfied with "premonitions"of tne Divine but insists on intimate know¬
ledge so that to tne typical religious soul tae eternal is not only more
also
moving,but^aearer and more real,than the things of sense.The religions
man always aims at closer and deeper knowledge of the* nature and the work
of Tod.
Fries does not attempt to deny that with the advance of the
ages tne religious ways of describing Tod's nature have likewise greatly
advanced.He admits that there is less falsehood in th9 Christian conception
of Cod than in any other but he does not admit that there i3 more truth.
Every definition of Cod that has been formed is for him necessarily only a
symbol which plays its part only so long as it serves tjo arouse in others
those feelings of devotion,resignation and guilt; that are natural to men
when the Cod whom instinctively they know has been revealed to them.T'he
definition is valuable only as a means to this end. It is only a symbol of
tne reality which is felt and ait bong a vast differences are possible in the
aegree of adeqaacy or usefalnsss of the symbol,from tie crude conceptions
of me aniaiist3 to tne- nighly developed and parified Shfcistian ideas, in
itself the symbol is of no value.No words or ihoaghbs or forms taien from
finite tilings oan apply to anything infinite or give any conception of its
nature.Tne infinite lies beyond ail oar powers of expression or of thqaghb.
Negatively we may Xaow it,may exolade tne petty misconceptions which many
nave formed of It,bat positively we oan say nothing aboat it sinoe all oar
tnoagnt is limited m things of sense and reflection upon them.
Once again Fries is partly right.It will be admitted by every relig¬
ions man that since 3-od is infinite the finite mind is anable completely
to comprehend His nature.Pat, while admitting that oar knowledge mast always
be incomplete,the religions mind would most strenaonsly maintain that it is
positive and ought to be trae so far as it goes.It is not exactly tras to
say that Fries identifies religion and art,bat still the two do tend to
approximate to one anotner in nis treatment of them.Tne aesthetic feeling
which conveys tne premonition of the-absolute reality covers both,the differ¬
ence being taat in the merely artistic view of any experience the interest
is more directly centred in the particular,while in the religions view at
is tarned primarily towards the eternal.In the essential content of the two
there is no farther difference.lt would not seem possible from this stand¬
point to distinguish between a merely aesthetic and a religions view of Sod.
And yet this is a distinction which mast be made and the ignoring of it can
be das to nothing else than a very defective observation of religions exper¬
ience. For religion implies far more than does art.In its highest forms it
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involves always an ethical relation between the subject and object of wor¬
ship' but. even where this ethical relation is absent - e.g. in some forms of
mysticism - the central part of tne experience is either a direct personal
relation or at least the recognition of a supreme irresistible power con¬
trolling tne individual life.Each of these is so foreign to the* merely
aesthetic feeling that it seems essential,if we are to discover what relig¬
ion really is,to enquire whether a distinction between the aesthetic and
the religious feelings can be made on the basis of our theory.
In Fries's own system this is not definitely done but the possib¬
ility of doing it is not by any means excluded.According to Fries the
aesthetic ideas under which religious ideas fail are defined as"a form of
perception which as a whole transcends the capacity of concepts",but. he
does not, seem inclined to admit; that there may be large differences in the
degree or direction in which different, experiences exceed our capacity for
expressing them in the categories of the understanding.Some of nis follow¬
ers did more justice to the facts here and realised that religion was
something unique, something not* so simple as t.o be> capable of constfnotion
out of tjhe< bar:e/element,s of Reason on of ..reduction to them, but; a complex and
concrete experience unliite any other.Put they did not expressly state the
position that seems a direct conclusion from the whole line- of argument
which we nave been following,that religion may have; its own categories
different even from those of t.he; general aesthetic judgment and' that the-
only test of tne validity of these is their necessity to explain tne facts
of religious experience.
The really crucial question has already been decided if it is
admitted that mechanical explanation falls short of complete explanation
and tnat,as we have seen,mast be admitted/Although in one aspect of its
«
nature everything can be shown to be subject to causal laws,nevertheless
even after such causal explanation has been completed there remains,not onli
in the* picture,in the organism and in the' person but also in the experience
of things generally,a factor unexplained.That means,therefore,that mathemat¬
ical knowledge is not adequate to the reality which we Know and that we
actually do possess^ome Knowledge beyond it.The mathematical is only one
degree of reality above wh.ich we Knew that others are others because in even
experience there is Knowledge that is not merely of mechanical sequence and
coexistence.As to wnat t.his higner degree of Knowledge or of reality is,
whether it again will submit t,o analysis and definition is. really a smaller
problem.The chief position has been won when it is shown that there is Know¬
ledge beyond what, the: mere senses give. From this point, of view it is a
question simply of fact; as t,o what the nature of that Knowledge is..
In t,he' general aesthetic judgment we have the category common
to ail grades of intuitive Knowledge - that of end,or unity in multiplicity.
Put this is only t,he lowest common measure of the' intuitive Knowledge and-
weefind that other categories are actually in use.For example,the concept¬
ion of personality is not merely an ethical postulate,nor is it merely a
subjective idea transferred to external things,but it is a conception wnich
is required to fit theifacts,a conception without wnich some'aspect of
tnese things is. left unaccounted for.And is it not a thoroughly consistent
procedure t,o maintain that in that intuition of the' eternal in the finite
of which Fries speaKs,or in tne religion with wnich he identifies it,we'
have still another category in actual use,that under which man comprehends
the infinitje?No a priori test can rule this out as impossible or as merely
DO.
imaginary,provided only t.hat the experience which gives rise t,o the con¬
ception cannot otherwise be rationalised.
It is here, however, that b.he difficulty does arise for b,he religious
view of t.he universe.lt is probably true that such a doctrine as the
doctrine< of Ideas,discussed in our: second chapter,is sufficient tp prove
that an Absolute Unity,ethically perfect,exists which may be b,he object of
religion, but the religious view of things requires much more than this.. For
religion it is essential that this Being should not only aanifepol be ultim¬
ately supreme, but. should also be active in the guidance and control of the'
present world and each personal life that is in it.It insists that Ood
should rule in the* world and maintains that He actually does direct the
course of individual life and the circumstances, into which it; is. set. Yet to
tne' eye of the non-religious observer there is no trace of anything unusual
in the facts and he quite naturally sets tne contrary opinion down to mere
imagination, holding that since' it is merely the subjective belief that,
finds anything else there, it cannot be said to be objectively true'. It is. a
fact that there are many men to whom religion is entirely unintelligible,
int.o wnose experience it never enters and to whom, therefore, it must appear
altogether imaginary.Nevertheless they are no mor9 necessarily right than
a blind man would be were he to declare' that there is no such thing as col¬
our. It; can only be accepted as a really grave.' criticism if it can be shown
tnat t.ne religious position is an abnormal one and essentially impossible
for some men to reach.Its subjectivity would be proved,for example,were it
shown to depend on temperament, or other psychological accident.Put it does
notj seem possible bp demonstrate this.On the contrary the balance of argu¬
ment seems clearly to fall on the other side.Not only ougnt every rational
uiSL- (_ aJU- ow*.
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being logic-ally mast do so. It} belongs to the fundamental nature of his
Reason that he should do so.He cannot rationalise his experience without
being led up to this belief.And the belief is in no abstraction but^ because
it is a necessary belieffits object must be a concrete reality or: Reason's
confidence in it,self falls to the' ground.How reality is a unity and all its
aspects or parts must be united by some common bondpthat is to say,we ex¬
pect to be able t,o rise, without^anf complete hiatus, from the knowledge of
the part t,o tpe knowledge of tjhe wnole and its relation to the- parts,and it
is. this possibility that the religious experience claims, to be able hp real¬
ise. The presumption is that the claim is valid unless the knowledge that
religion brings is inconsistent with what we otherwise gain.
Fries does not himself find any inconsistency between the ex¬
perience s'to which he reduces tns manifold of religious feeling and the-
knowledge which science gives us/of the'particular objects of the senses. In
nis account ,however,the opposition is avoided simply because religion is
reduced far below the point} at whicn it might be conceived to enter.It con¬
sists merely in these classes of feeling:- (l)the feeling of' worship or
devotjion - believing confidence and nope in the omnipotence of Sod, (2).
submission - the' recognition of guilt,and the desire for salvation and trans
formation,and (3)inspirat;ion - the- feeling that our own personal worth is
superior to the whole of nat,are,that enthusiasm or: exaltation which relig¬
ion brings t-p men. These, however,do not exhaust religion, essential as hpey
undoubtedly are tp all its forms.Even more characteristic than they are is
A.
the belief that in the' sphere of action the natural and supernatural are
inter-related,that ope infinite works and manifests its activity in partic¬
ular. everr r?il i ginii i || . .
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ular events. The: rsligioas experience includes not only general and indef¬
inite feelings buo; also knowledge of 3-od as a power actually present in,and
not. merely behind,finite events.
It is here that the inconsistency might be supposed to enter
which would rule religious knowledge out..,: as impossible, but it does so only
if the nature of the fiJivine activity be> too narrowly interpreted.As to wnorl
whether it, is or is not conceivable that the sequence of finite causes and
effects may be broken by the interposition of some infinite causality,we a
are not called upon here to decide.That Is not*, in any case', the: real odaeaofc
general characteristic of Cod's action but at the most, only an occasional
instance of it.The nature of the Divine activity,on the: reality of which
the possibility of a living religion depends,is fundamentally the: actual
and active working of Cod in certain events more directly than in others,
and this does not, necessarily oome into conflict with mechanical causation a
at all. It. does so only if the mistake be made of exalt.ing this category
to be the final and ultimate principle of all being,instead of regarding it;
as. only the highest form of t.he mathematical arrangement of finite events..
We nave seen that, even a complete account of the: antecedents of many events
does not exhaust their content but. leaves a factor unaccounted for,and this,
is much truer of certain things than of others.Certain aspects of these
demand the use. of other categories and it is in these cases that the relig¬
ious view is. justified.The' causal connection remains unbroken,but; in addit¬
ion to that there is in the' event and in. its origin something more which
for the: religious man can be characterised only as the immediate presence
of the Infinite.
One other consideration confirms to some extent this conclusion
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as to tae necessity of religious categories. It. follows from what appears
to be one aspect of t.tie general nature of religious experience - the* feel¬
ing of personal communion with a higher Power. Although this description
would never exhaust its content,nevertheless it forms what is probably the'
most, general and characteristic single statement, that can be made about
religious experience^ §f the higher types.In the religion of the average
man it is certainly the prominent feature and in the more abnormal and
extremer types,such as mysticism,something parallel is manifested.That is.
to say,the particular things of the material world and the forms of these
particular things are transcended while person claims to meet, directly
with person. fJow even in the spoers of human relationships this personal
relation is an ultimate one which cannot be described in terms of anything
but itself but on wnich it is nevertheless impossible to throw any suspic-
£
ion of unreality.A similar relationship with the' supreme Being has a simil¬
ar claim to be> considered real if only the experience be as necessary; and
the category of personality may thus be found to be properly applicable to
Cod.
So also the' active presence of Sod in the' finite world may be found
to be a true feature involved in this, higner knowledge of reality,and other
conceptions may be discovered which are applicable to the supreme' Being,
without, an unjustifiable intellectualising of religion. Considered as a gen¬
eralised description of what religion actually is as an experience,Fries's
account of it. as an indefinite intuition of sometning too great for words is
entirely true. It. is always in the> first place an immediate tning,felt to be'
an intensely personal experience and therefore not primarily of a releoting
nature.It; involves more Gh&h knowledge just as ethical relations do,and in
it it is the emotional faoalt4.es which ar^especially strongly stimulated.
Religion cannot be expressed in merely intellectual terms,but it is. a com¬
plex mental state; and may be analysed into its constituent factors.Though
not. itself reflective, it. may be reflected upon and-the conditions under
which the experience is possible, may be made known. .Just, as sensuous exper¬
ience establishes the prinoipl«s4rhich it involves, so does religion estab¬
lish the principles which are. involved in it and tnus add to our knowledge
of reality.
It must,of course,be admitted that much that is called religion
nas its sources, no deeper t,han in the* imagination and will not endure the
test of examination.There is undoubtedly a temptation in the. method we have;
been seeking to justify for men to claim t.hat if experience be th9' ultimate
test of truth their own experience is sufficient evidence for them ; and. it
is easy under such, circumstances t.o imagine the necessity of an experience
established by the intensity of the feeling which it arouses.A man feels
himself wonderfully moved and naturally will believe at onoe that, he has
come into contact with Tod. Put so long as it, is a mere feeling without any
definitely realised basis in the; realities external to the individual,it
cannot escape the charge, of subjectivity,and no matter how real the. exper¬
ience may appear: to the man himself at the t.ime, it will not stand the- test
of oriticism.lt, will not be> possible for him to satisfy even himself that
it is a necessary experience and not merely voluntarily induced.
'The certainty of religion or of religious forms must, like all
otner certainty excepting that of the; ultimate principle of tne- Self-confid¬
ence of Reason,ultimately depend on what is given to the mind - i.e.things
and eve-nth. Valid religion must be historical.lt must be- in the actual world
so.
that it. discovers otjtier forms and categories to be necessary.The subject¬
ive experience must, be the' product of an objective, fact which can be recog¬
nised as such.3od must be in the world which exists independently of us and
in our experience only as a consequence of this.
So it is that religion adds to the conceptions of Pure Season
these conceptions of the personality and ethical perfection and special
presence of Sod,and adds them as conceptions which convey real and definite
knowledge to the' mind.In doing so it emphasises the necessity which we have
already seen to exist of uniting all principles of knowledge into one sysr-
tematic whole.Religion is not. inferior in the1 certainty of its convictions
tp the other exercises of Reason,but it can only obtain a final and ade¬
quate justification wnen the unity of all the principles pf knowledge is
discovered and their relations to one another shown t.o be entirely consist¬
ent and complementary.For Pries this unity could be nothing more than a
"suspicion"or"premonition",but this seems x,p have, been an unnecessary and
unwarrantable despair of the success of the. work of analysis and synthesis.
If Reason be a unity, it must in the end be a unity which. Reason oan know.
